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THE FALLACY OF JUDICIAL SUPERMAJORITY
CLAUSES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS*
Sandra Zellmer** and Kathleen Miller***
DEDICATION TO SUSAN MARTYN (BY SANDRA ZELLMER)

of Toledo College of Law as a brand
at the University
I arrived professor
HEN
new assistant
in 1997, like many new professors, I knew
very little about two of the pillars of academic life: teaching and scholarship. I
had been a successful practitioner in both the private sector and the federal
government, but this was a whole new ball game, and the expectations and
demands were far different from anything I had ever experienced. Enter Susan
Martyn.
I knew from the beginning that Susan would have a significant impact on
my life, both personally and professionally. On the personal front, the day I
arrived in town she arrived on my doorstep on Goddard Road, which was only a
few blocks away from her own abode, and insisted on mowing my lawn. Well,
in truth, Susan was curious about the efficacy of our brand new push reel mower,
but she dove into the task with the zeal that I soon realized was her personal
hallmark. As a neighbor, my husband Randy and I got to know Susan, as well as
her husband Peter and their daughters, Angie and Sarah. Throughout the years,
we frequently shared meals (the cinnamon roll contest was especially rewarding)
and exchanged pet-watching and other services. Now, long after I have left
Toledo, Susan'sjoie de vivre and indomitable spirit continue to uplift me through
both good times and bad.
On the professional front, Susan led by example and by careful tutoring in
teaching me how to be a teacher. I spent hours in her classroom, observing her
techniques and her interactions with students, and even more hours in our offices
and over lunch at Ferdo's on Bancroft Street, going over my own experiments,
challenges, and teaching evaluations. Ever patient, ever enthusiastic, ever
creative. That is Susan. And that is why I am still a teacher and why I strive for
some fraction of the excellence she brought to the task. As for scholarship, her
guidance and insights were unparalleled, especially in drafting my first few
articles. Susan always pushed me to dig deeper, to reach farther, to write more
clearly and concisely, and to believe in myself as a persuasive scholar and not

W

* A previous version of portions of this essay appeared on-line as Kathleen Miller, The Fifth
Judge: Thompson v. Heineman and Nebraska's Judicial Supermajority Clause, 6 NEB. L. REV.
BULL. 1 (2015), available at http://lawreviewbulletin.unl.edu/?p=1223.
**
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just an advocate. Her remarkable productivity continues to be nothing short of
inspirational.
But the reason I wanted to contribute to this tribute issue and to write a
piece with a student of my own is because of Susan's lasting impact as a mentor.
Just as she never failed to welcome me and my questions and concerns into her
office, her home, and her email inbox, I hope to carry on the traditions and values
she instilled in me by paying it forward to the next generation of lawyers and
academics. That our topic explores an unusual facet of both Nebraska and Ohio
law puts icing on that cake. Here's to you, Susan!
INTRODUCTION

In 2008, when TransCanada proposed its Keystone XL (hereinafter "KXL")
pipeline route from Alberta, Canada through the heartland of the United States, it
likely did not believe the proposal would generate much attention. After all,
TransCanada already had another pipeline running through Nebraska and several
other affected states. The thought that the Keystone XL project would be at a
standstill seven years later seemed unfathomable. The possibility that a rarely
invoked constitutional supermajority clause would play a key role in the
controversy seemed equally unlikely.
Opposition to the project developed quickly. By 2011, the debate over the
pipeline had surged to the forefront of the national stage, with Nebraska squarely
in the middle of the controversy. Following a 2011 special session in which
Nebraska legislators passed a series of bills dealing with the state's pipelinepermitting process, Nebraska passed an additional piece of legislation in the 2012
regular session: Legislative Bill 1161 (hereinafter "LB 1161").' Whereas
legislation passed during the 2011 special session required pipeline applicants to
obtain approval from the Public Service Commission (hereinafter "PSC"), LB
1161 allowed "major oil pipeline" carriers to bypass the PSC and receive
approval from the Governor to exercise eminent domain in the state. 2
Landowners challenged the law on the grounds that it was unconstitutional
for a variety of reasons, including that it was an unlawful delegation of power to
the governor.
By the time Thompson v. Heineman4 reached the Nebraska
Supreme Court, it appeared the case would definitively decide LB 1161's fate
and, possibly, the fate of KXL as well.
However, the manner in which the court eventually decided Thompson did
not resolve the constitutional issues surrounding LB 1161. Invoking a moribund
rule, four out of seven judges found LB 1161 unconstitutional, but the Supreme
Court vacated the entirety of the lower court's decision due to Nebraska's
judicial supermajority or "five judges" clause.5 In Thompson, only four judges
1.
through
2.
3.
4.
5.

2012 Neb. Laws L.B. 1161 (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 57-1101 (Westlaw current
Ist Reg. Sess. 104th Leg. 2015)).
Thompson v. Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731, 740 (Neb. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 766-67.
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decided LB 1161 was unconstitutional-one judge short of the five needed to
strike down the law. 6
Part I of this essay discusses the history of the judicial supernajority clause
in the three states that have enacted one: Ohio, North Dakota, and Nebraska. Part
II examines the impact of the supermajority clause on several high stakes
constitutional cases and, in particular, how the clause came into play in
Thompson v. Heineman. Importantly, Thompson demonstrates how such clauses
allow statutes to evade judicial review and thereby prevent important
constitutional issues from being resolved on the merits. Part III concludes that
Nebraska should follow Ohio's lead and repeal its supermajority clause.
I. THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE JUDICIAL SUPERMAJORITY CLAUSE

While judicial supermajority clauses are rare in American law, they are not
unprecedented. Provisions that require legislatures to muster two-thirds or more
votes to enact certain kinds of measures are more common than judicial
supermajority provisions. The U.S. Constitution includes seven legislative
supermajority provisions applicable to Congress, ranging from presidential
impeachment to treaty consent to overriding vetoes, but none apply to the
judiciary.' Generally speaking, legislative supermajority provisions are designed
to effectuate separation of powers and to address only the most important
matters: "extraordinary situations implicating either individual rights or
interbranch or intergenerational checks and balances." 8
As is the case with most types of legislative action, judicial review by the
U.S. Supreme Court requires only a simple majority, whether the case in question
involves a constitutional challenge or anything else. 9 Although proposals to
impose a two-thirds supermajority requirement on the U.S. Supreme Court to
invalidate statutes on constitutional grounds occasionally arise from time to time,

6. Id.
7. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6 (impeachment); U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2 (congressional
expulsion); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3 (veto override); U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty
consent); U.S. CONST. art. V (constitutional amendments); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 3
(rebellion); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXV, § 4 (presidential incapacity). Article V also requires
supermajorities of the states for constitutional conventions and amendments. For a discussion of
the history of supermajority provisions in the U.S. Constitution, see Brett W. King, The Use of
Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution: The Framers, the Federalist Papers and the
Reinforcement of a FundamentalPrinciple,8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363 (1997).
8. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of
Amendment Fever, 17 CARDoZO L. REv. 691, 697-98 (1996). See also Robert S. Leach, House
Rule XXI and an Argument Against a Constitutional Requirement for Majority Rule in Congress,
44 UCLA L. REv. 1253, 1259 (1997) (stating the limited number of provisions requiring a twothirds vote demarcate "certain issues deemed too important to be left to a simple majority").
9. U.S. CONST. art. 111. See also Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99
YALE L.J. 1503, 1504 (1990) (noting Hamilton's position on judicial review in Federalist No. 78:
"[W]here the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people
declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the former.").
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none have passed.' 0 Arguably, whether in the legislative or judicial context,
"[t]he Framers knew the dangers of supermajorities, and they realized that any
government that was to maintain its vitality over time would be wise to avoid
them except in extraordinary circumstances.""1
Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court itself recognizes that declaring legislation
unconstitutional is "the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on
to perform."' 2 As a result, it has adopted various mechanisms that serve as a
judicial "check" on declaring legislative acts unconstitutional. One of the most
frequently invoked mechanisms is a presumption in favor of constitutionality
where "if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [the
legislation], there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts."' 3
According to the Court, this presumption shows respect for Congress's
conclusions that its enactments are constitutional, promotes democratic principles
by preventing undue judicial interference with congressional prerogatives, and
recognizes Congress's institutional superiority over the judiciary with regard to
public policy matters and certain kinds of factual determinations. 14 In addition,
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance-where courts decide cases on statutory
grounds whenever possible-serves as another form of judicial check.' 5
Legislative supermajority provisions are not uncommon in state
constitutions,' 6 but only three states, Ohio, North Dakota, and Nebraska, have
enacted a judicial supermajority.1" All three states adopted their judicial
supermajority requirements during the Progressive Era, seemingly in response to

&

10. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 9, at 1522; Martin Wishnatsky, Taming the Supreme Court, 6
LIBERTY U. L. REv. 597, 673 (2012) (arguing "[j]udicial repeal of legislation is surely as solemn
and significant an event as an impeachment trial, expulsion of a legislator, override of a
Presidential veto, or ratification of a constitutional amendment" and, therefore, should require a
two-thirds majority); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and
Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REv. 893, 994 (2003) (advocating for a six-three
judicial supermajority requirement and arguing that "the Supreme Court ... has aggrandized itself
and encroached upon the power of Congress over the past decade").
11. Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, On Supermajoritiesand the Constitution, 83 GEO. L.J.
2347, 2376 (1995).
12. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
13. Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934).
14. F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1447, 1449 (2010).
15. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
16. See Brett W. King, Deconstructing Gordon and Contingent Legislative Authority: The
Constitutionality of Supermajority Rules, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 133, 141 (1999) (noting
states have historically had "broad latitude to depart from majority rule"); John 0. McGinnis
Michael B. Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further
Defense of the Constitutionalityof Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L.J. 327, 345 (1997)
(arguing state legislative supermajority rules "were well known at the time of the Framing").
17. Minnesota considered but rejected a supermajority requirement in 1914. Jonathan L.
Entin, Judicial Supermajorities and the Validity of Statutes: How Mapp Became a Fourth
Amendment Landmark Instead of a First Amendment Footnote, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 441, 469
(2001). Among U.S. territories, the Puerto Rico Constitution requires ajudicial supermajority. See
Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474 (1979) (refusing to pass on the constitutionality of Puerto
Rico's provision as applied to a search and seizure case).
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the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, as well as populist
sentiment.' 8 As the Progressive movement swept across the country at the turn
of the twentieth century, several hard-fought reforms faced a swift death in the
courts when challenged as unconstitutional. One such case was the infamous
Lochner v. New York decision, in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a
New York law limiting bakery workers to sixty hour work weeks.1 9 Seeking to
protect such reforms from the threat of destruction at the hands of the judiciary,
Ohio adopted a judicial supermajority clause requirement in 1912, North Dakota
in 1919, and Nebraska in 1920.20
Ohio's 1912 Constitutional Convention was a clash of ideologies between
conservative business interests seeking to change the tax system and progressives
trying to enact a series of reforms, including reform of the state's complicated
court system.2 ' Much like the wider concerns raised by the Lochner ruling, the
progressives were particularly upset that the Ohio Supreme Court had invalidated
a series of laws dealing with workers' rights and other subjects championed by
the progressive movement. 22 Early on, one delegate proposed a provision that
would require a unanimous decision by the court to invalidate a statute.23
Delegate Hiram V. Peck explained the rationale for the proposal:
"There have been too many judgments that have been made by the supreme court
which seem to the people not well grounded, in view of existing circumstances, and
which operate as stumbling blocks to progress, upsetting statutes which were
desirable in themselves ....
Additionally, Peck voiced his fear that judges were acting on their own political
beliefs, pointing to the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court had recently struck
down a mechanics' law similar to one the U.S. Supreme Court had recently
upheld.
[W]e didn't want the legislation of the people tinkered with too easily. We were
afraid [political expediency] had been in fact in some later decisions.... [T]here
was a great deal of kicking about the mechanics' lien law. An act in identical terms
has been sustained by the supreme court of the United States and the supreme courts

18. Sandra Zellmer, Keystone XL Pipeline Route through Nebraska Upheld on Constitutional
Technicality-for Now, CPRBLOG (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.progressivereform.org/CPR
Blog.cfm?idBlog=EEC8FFCB-942B-4764-55172CC3E973EEF8.
19. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
20. Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority
Rules: Lessonsfrom the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 90-93 (2003).
21. Entin, supra note 17, at 443.
22. Id. at 443-44.
23. Id. at 445.
24. Id. at 446 (quoting PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

THE STATE OF OHIO 1028 (E.S. Nichols ed., 1912) [hereinafter OHIO PROCEEDINGS]).
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of half a dozen other states, yet the supreme court of Ohio has declared it
unconstitutional. 25
Two distinguished visitors to the Ohio Constitutional Convention also
voiced support for stronger restraints on the judiciary.
Former President
Theodore Roosevelt denounced recent decisions, such as Lochner, and advocated
for the ability to recall major opinions by a vote of the people.26 In Roosevelt's
opinion, "the American people as a whole have shown themselves wiser than the
courts in the way they have approached and dealt with such vital questions of our
day as those concerning the proper control of big corporations and of securing
their rights to industrial workers."27 William Jennings Bryan, a dominant
populist force in the Democratic Party who was known as "The Great
Commoner" due to his faith in the wisdom of the common people, echoed similar
rhetoric while addressing the convention, specifically in advocating for the
election of judges: "The people are much more apt to deal justly with [elected]
judges than they are to receive justice at the hands of judges who distrust the
intelligence and the good intent of the masses."28 Along the same lines, Bryan
believed a judicial supermajority requirement would be a reasonable measure as
well. 2 9 The proposed judicial supermajority provision was later heavily debated
but eventually passed, requiring "all but one" of the judges of the Ohio Supreme
Court to agree in order to invalidate a state law.o
Ohio's judicial supermajority clause came under fire soon after it was
passed. The Ohio Supreme Court characterized the "drastic limitation[]" as an
ill-conceived "compromise" between the polar positions of allowing the court to
continue to rule on cases with a simple majority and abolishing judicial review
entirely. 3 1
Ultimately, the clause was relatively short-lived. By the 1960s, issues with
the supermajority requirement were readily apparent.32 Many of the problems
were a result of Ohio's unique court structure and how the lower courts of appeal
ruled on challenged statutes. 3 3 For example, if a lower appellate court held the
law was unconstitutional, the state supreme court only needed a simple majority
to hold the statute unconstitutional.34 If, on the other hand, the court of appeals
had upheld the law, the Ohio Supreme Court could only reverse and find the law
unconstitutional by having all but one judge rule against the statute.3 5 Since there

25. OHIO PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 1030.
26. Entin, supra note 17, at 444 & n.22 (citing OHIO PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 384-86).
27. OHIO PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 385.

28. Id. at 669.
29. Id. at 669-70.
30. Entin, supra note 17, at 451.
31. See Turner v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 117 N.E. 232, 234 (Ohio 1917) (upholding the
Workmen's Compensation Act).
32. Entin, supra note 17, at 464.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 448-49.
35. Id. at 449.
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were several courts of appeals, it was possible that a law might be upheld in one
court and struck down in another. This created a perplexing problem-unless the
Ohio Supreme Court met the "all but one" requirement to invalidate the law, the
law could be constitutional in one district and unconstitutional in another. 3 6
Additional issues arose, including whether the supermajority clause applied
to rulings on municipal ordinances or only to state statutes and whether a statute
could be invalidated with less than the full bench of the court in play when
disability or recusal forced one or more justices not to sit in particular cases.37 Of
particular embarrassment, several statutes that limited free speech were found to
be unconstitutional-but remained on the books due to the supermajority
clause-only to be later overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court on First
Amendment or other constitutional grounds. 38
Ohio's supermajority requirement was repealed in 1968, sparking almost no
debate. 39 As Professor Entin notes, Ohio's supermajority clause was a "wellintentioned experiment [that] was at best a noble failure, at worst a disaster that
endured far too long." 40

North Dakota adopted its supermajority requirement in 1918.41
The
amendment had been proposed as part of an omnibus provision by the
Nonpartisan League (hereinafter "NPL"), which controlled the North Dakota
42
House of Representatives.
Similar to the concerns expressed by Ohio delegates
in 1912, the proponents of North Dakota's "four judges" clause worried the state
supreme court might undo hard-fought legislative reforms. 43 In particular, NPL
"feared a Supreme Court, dominated by justices linked to its opponents, might
invalidate important parts of its measures to aid farmers against business interests
seen as antithetical."44 While the omnibus provision was defeated by the state
senate, the amendment survived when it was offered by non-NPL senators as an
individual resolution. 4 5 The amendment passed during the general election of
1918 and is still in place today.46 It has saved several statutory provisions that a
majority found unconstitutional, including the state's statutory method for
distributing funding for primary and secondary education 4 7 and a referendum

36. Id. at 456-57.
37. Id. at 457-58.
38. See State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953), overruled by Superior
Films, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam).
39. Entin, supra note 17, at 465-66.

40. Id. at 466.
41. Herbert L. Meschke & Ted Smith, The North Dakota Supreme Court: A Century of

Advances, 76 N.D. L. REv. 217, 248 (2000).
42. Id. at 247.
43. Id
44. Id.

45. Id. at 248.
46. Id.
47. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 250 (N.D. 1994).
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measure to reinstate the "Fighting Sioux" nickname for the state's intercollegiate
athletic teams.4 8
Similar to Ohio's judicial supermajority clause, Nebraska's clause resulted
from the state constitutional convention of 1919-1920. The legislature called for
a constitutional convention to address several perceived shortcomings within the
Nebraska Constitution of 1875.49 The main problem with the 1875 Constitution
was that it was nearly impossible to amend. o At the same time, unrest in the
Midwest had reached its peak over hot-button social and economic issues, such
as farm welfare, elitism, post-World War I anti-German prejudices, Prohibition,
and anti-monopoly sentiments.5 ' Progressives in Nebraska sought a variety of
reforms, including tax reforms, a unicameral legislature, and new judicial
procedures. 52 Both major political parties in the state soon found themselves
"caught up in the general desire for a constitutional convention to carry out a
general overhauling of the basic law of the state."5 3
When it finally convened, nine of the 336 proposals at the convention dealt
with the power of the Nebraska Supreme Court to declare acts of the legislature
unconstitutional.5 4 Two elements greatly influenced the adoption of the "five
judge" requirement: the presence of the NPL (as in North Dakota) and the
support of William Jennings Bryan. The NPL, with strong support among
populists in the state at the time, fiercely advocated for a proposal that would
prevent the state supreme court from invalidating a legislative measure on
constitutional grounds at all.
Mindful of the public's views and worried about
how the proposal might be received if it were put to a public vote, the delegation
compromised with the NPL and raised the required number of justices for a
finding of unconstitutionality from a simple majority to the "five judges"
requirement.56
In addition to pressure from the NPL, Bryan himself directly addressed the
Nebraska Convention.
Bryan's remarks reflected both Ohio's and North
Dakota's reasons for enacting a judicial supermajority requirement-restraining
the judiciary's power to overturn decisions made by the people and their elected
representatives.57 In his remarks, Bryan stated:

48. State Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Jaeger, 815 N.W.2d 215, 216, 221 (N.D. 2012).
49. Paul W. Madgett, The "Five Judge" Rule in Nebraska, 2 CREIGHTON L. REV. 329, 329-30
(1969).
50. A.B. Winter, ConstitutionalRevision in Nebraska: A Brief History and Commentary, 40
NEB. L. REV. 580, 583 (1961).
51. See MICHAEL KAZIN, A GODLY HERO: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 177-78, 20161 (2006); ROBERT D. MIEWALD & PETER J. LONGO, THE NEBRASKA STATE CONSTITUTION 21
(2011).
52. Winter, supra note 50, at 585.
53. Id.
54. Madgett, supra note 49, at 330.
55. William Jay Riley, To Require that a Majority of the Supreme Court Determine the
Outcome ofAny Case Before It, 50 NEB. L. REv. 622, 625-26 (1971).
56. Id. at 626.
57. Id. at 633.
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The fundamental principle of popular government, whether coercive or cooperative, is that the people have a right to have what they want in government....
Not that the people will make no mistakes, but that the people have a right to make
their own mistakes, and that few people have a God-given right to make mistakes
for the rest of the people....
... The supreme court only should have power to declare a law unconstitutional,
and it only by three-fourths vote of the court. It is not fair to the legislators or to
those who elect them-especially when we have the referendum-to allow what
58
they have declared to be the people's will to be overthrown by one judge.

In keeping with his deeply rooted populist sentiments, Bryan's remarks
highlighted the perceived sanctity of popular initiatives and referendums where
the people themselves come together to make legislative change. 59 However, the
supermajority proposal under consideration was not limited to such provisions
but, rather, extended to all types of legislation, however enacted.o
Additional debates on the clause illuminated the further reasoning for the
adoption of Nebraska's supermajority clause. Delegates pointed to a series of
progressive reforms struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court on a 5-4 vote.61
Members of the convention viewed the supermajority clause as lending stability
to the judicial process by preventing 5-4 decisions that might be later overturned
by yet another 5-4 decision, leading to abrupt 180-degree changes in the law. 6 2
Others argued for giving the public, through its elected representatives, the
benefit of the doubt in cases where the constitutionality of a provision was in
question.63 As voiced by one delegate, "where there is a doubt about the
constitutionalit of the law, [the public] want[s] the people to have the advantage
of that doubt."
Later, when the "five judge" rule was presented to the public during a
special election, only 77,586 voted on the proposal, comPared to the presidential
For Nebraska, "[t]he
election turnout of 382,653 voters only six weeks later.
minority control of the supreme court under the five judge rule on constitutional
questions was definitely adopted by a distinct minority of the qualified voters

58. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEBRASKA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1919-1920, at 307, 319
(1920).
59. Riley, supra note 55, at 633.
60. Id. at 640-41. Nebraska's constitution was amended to authorize popular initiatives and
referenda just a few years earlier in 1912. NEB. CONST. art. III, § IA (1912), Laws 1911, ch. 223,
§ 2, at 671 (codified at NEB. CONST. art. Ill, §§ 2-3).
61.

In addition to Lochner, these cases included Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158

U.S. 601 (1895) (striking down an income tax law), and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (ruling a child labor law unconstitutional).
62. John Dinan, Framing a "People's Government": State Constitution-Making in the
ProgressiveEra, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 933, 955 (1999).

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Riley, supra note 55, at 627.
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within the state." 6 6 There have been attempts to eliminate the "five judges"
clause, including durinf the 1970 proceedings of the Nebraska Constitutional
Revision Commission.6 While the Commission could find "no good reason" to
keep the provision, it was not repealed.68
II. THE JUDICIAL SUPERMAJORITY CLAUSE AT PLAY IN NEBRASKA COURTS

The requirement that five judges hold a law unconstitutional in order to
strike it down is found in Nebraska Constitution art. V § 2:
The Supreme Court shall consist of seven judges, one of whom shall be the Chief
Justice. A majority of the judges shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. A
majority of the members sitting shall have authority to pronounce a decision except
in cases involving the constitutionality of an act of the Legislature. No leislative
act shall be held unconstitutionalexcept by the concurrenceoffivejudges.

Effectively, the clause operates to protect legislation that would otherwise be
found unconstitutional and allows that legislation to stand. Unlike Ohio or North
Dakota, however, Nebraska's supermajority clause applies whether the litigants
are raising a federal or state constitutional challenge.7
Following its adoption, Nebraska's judicial supermajority clause lay
dormant for several decades. It was first used as a deciding factor in two 1968
72
While occasionally mentioned
cases-In re Cavitti and DeBacker v. Brainard.
73
in subsequent case law, the clause was not employed as the deciding factor
again until State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann74 in 2000 and then not again until
Thompson v. Heineman75 in 2015.

In re Cavitt involved a state statute that required mental patients to be
sterilized as a condition of being released from a state home. 6 While four judges
found the law unconstitutional, the supermajority clause forced the court to allow
the statute to stand. 7 The U.S. Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction but

66. Id.
67. Id. at 623.
68. Id. at 622-23.
69. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (emphasis added).
70. Caminker, supra note 20, at 90-94 (citing DeBacker v. Brainerd, 161 N.W.2d 508 (Neb.
1968)).
71. In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d 171 (Neb. 1968), reh'g denied, 159 N.W.2d 566 (1968), vacated
as moot, 396 U.S. 996 (1969).
72. DeBacker, 161 N.W.2d at 508.
73. See State ex rel. Belker v. Bd. of Educ. Lands and Funds, 175 N.W.2d 63 (Neb. 1970)
(dismissing on jurisdictional grounds); State v. Johnson, 695 N.W.2d 165 (Neb. 2005) (deciding on
other grounds).
74. State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 455 N.W.2d 749 (Neb. 1990).
75. Thompson v. Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731, 739 (Neb. 2015).
76. In re Cavitt, 157 N.W.2d at 174-75.
77. Id. at 181 (Newton, J., dissenting).
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vacated the case as moot when Nebraska repealed the statute. 8 A similar
situation arose in Brainard, where only four judges found the Juvenile Court
Act-which allowed juvenile offenders to be tried without a jury trial and applied
a "preponderance of the evidence" standard instead of the traditional "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard-to be unconstitutional.
In State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, the Nebraska Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of legislation that transferred Kearney State College into the
University of Nebraska system.80 While four judges determined the legislation
was unconstitutional, the court upheld the statute based on the judicial
supermajority requirement.
As in In re Cavitt, Brainard, and Spire, the plaintiffs in Thompson v.
Heineman sought to strike down a state statute as unconstitutional.
Their first
argument stemmed from the act's delegation of powers normally possessed by
the PSC to the Governor.83 The PSC was incorporated into the Nebraska
Constitution in 1906.84 Indicative of the Progressive era in which it was enacted,
the PSC consists of five elected commissioners wholly independent from the
governor.85 It was created to minimize the ability of railroads and other carriers,
utilities, and public services to influence governors and to make the decisionmaking processes professional rather than purely political.86
Under Article IV of the Nebraska Constitution, "The powers and duties of
[the PSC] shall include the regulation of rates, service and general control of
common carriers as the Legislature may provide by law."8 7 As four judges of the
court pointed out, the PSC constitutes a unique agency under Nebraska law-"an
independent regulatory body for common carriers.' 88 In Thompson, four judges
determined the proposed KXL pipeline qualified as a "common carrier" and,
thus, fell under the PSC's powers, rendering LB 1161 unconstitutional. 89 The
same four judges further found LB 1161 unconstitutional because it unlawfully

78. Cavitt v. Nebraska, 396 U.S. 996 (1969).
79. DeBacker, 161 N.W.2d at 509.
80. Beermann, 455 N.W.2d at 750.
81. Id. at 749.
82. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 740.
83. Id. at 756.
84. Id. at 757.
85. Thompson v. Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731, 757 (Neb. 2015).
86. Jim Snyder, Keystone Future Hinges on 19th-Century Railroad Reforms, BLOOMBERG,
(Apr 30, 2014, 2:10 PM EST), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-04-30/keystonefuture-hinges-on-19th-century-railroad-reforms (noting Progressive-era commissions were created
to insulate regulatory processes "from the normal give and take of electoral politics"). See
generally MIEWALD & LONGO, supra note 51 (detailing the history of the PSC); Werner Troesken,
Regime Change and Corruption: A History of Public Utility Regulation, in CORRUPTION AND
REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S ECONOMic HISTORY 259 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin

eds., 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9986 (giving a general history of public
utility regulation).
87. NEB. CONST. art. IV,

§ 20.

88. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 757.
89. Id. at 759.
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delegated the power to grant eminent domain to private organizations to the
Governor when only the legislature has the legal authority to grant eminent
domain powers. 90
The plaintiffs in Thompson would have won the day before almost any
other appellate court in the country with a simple majority of the justices. Four
out of seven judges found LB 1161 unconstitutional. 91 However, the three
remaining judges did not reach any conclusions on the constitutionality of LB
1161, finding instead that the plaintiffs lacked standing as "resident taxpayers."9 2
Due to Nebraska's judicial supermajority clause, LB 1161 was allowed to remain
on the books while the case was remanded back to the district court. 93
The court was not wrong in hinging its decision on the judicial
supermajority clause; the court is constitutionally bound to have five concurring
judges in order to strike down a state law as unconstitutional.9 4 However,
Thompson highlights the negative impacts of a judicial supermajority clause.
First, while the Thompson decision did not conclusively rule on the
constitutionality of LB 1161, every jud e reaching the merits of the case
determined LB 1161 was unconstitutional.
Effectively, the clause allowed LB
1161 to remain good law in the state, not because any court determined it passed
constitutional muster, but only because the plaintiffs failed to convince a fifth
judge to reach the merits of their arguments. Arguably, this tips the balance of
power between the state branches of government too far in favor of the
legislature. Nebraska's unique unicameral legislature already consolidates power
into one house.96 Without a second legislative body, Nebraska's legislature is not
constrained by the traditional "checks and balances" of a two-house legislature,
resulting in fewer hurdles for legislation to pass before being enacted into state
law. 97 In light of this structure, an "independent and unhampered judiciary"
seems even more critical to preserve the balance of power between the three
branches. 98 Instead, the judicial supermajority clause allows the legislature to

90. Id. at 765.
91. Id. at 739.
92. Id. at 773-74 (Heavican, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part in the result). While
Nebraska "allows resident taxpayers to, without showing any [peculiar] interest or injury, ... bring
an action to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds," courts grant standing under this
exception rarely and only when the matter is one of "great public concern." Project Extra Mile v.
Neb. Liquor Control Comm'n, 810 N.W.2d 149, 157, 159-60 (Neb. 2012). See, e.g., Cunningham
v. Exon, 276 N.W.2d 213 (Neb. 1979); Nebraskans Against Expanded Gambling, Inc. v. Neb.
Horseman's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 605 N.W.2d 803, 805 (Neb. 2000); State ex rel. Reed
v. State Game & Parks Comm'n, 773 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb. 2009).
93. Thompson, 857 N.W.2d at 766-67.
94. Id. at 754.
95. In addition to the four judges in Thompson, the trial court judge also found LB 1161
unconstitutional. Thompson v. Heineman, CI 12-2060 (D. Neb. Feb. 19, 2014), available at
http://www.dominalaw.com/documents/lb- 1161-court-order-feb-I 9-2014.pdf.
96. Riley, supra note 55, at 636.
97. Id.
98. Id. See also JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH
FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 167 (Gaillard Hunt & James
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insulate itself from being held accountable when it passes laws that may be
unconstitutional.
Second, imposing a supermajority requirement on the judicial branch
undermines the ability of the court to protect the constitutional rights of
vulnerable individuals and groups.
Although the Thompson plaintiffs are
Nebraska landowners, taxpayers, and electors of the State, rather than
disenfranchised individuals, they allege violations of due process and other
bedrock constitutional rights.99 Democracy turns not only on majority rule, but
also on the human rights that enable all individuals and groups to participate
meaningfully in political, economic, and social life. As Justice Aharon Barak
said, protecting the rights of minorities, in particular, "cannot be left only in the
hands of the legislature and the executive, which, by their nature, reflect majority
opinion."loo Requiring a supermajority of the court to invalidate laws as
unconstitutional makes unpopular racial and religious minorities and others
whose characteristics or viewpoints are disfavored by mainstream public opinion
more vulnerable to what James Madison called the "transient impressions" of the
people and their elected representatives.10 1 Indeed, both the Bill of Rights and
constitutional provisions for judicial review exist in large part to protect
unpopular individuals and groups from being trampled by political majorities. 102
In exercising its responsibility within our constitutional framework, the U.S.
Supreme Court has invalidated state laws that denied the fundamental right to
marry to same-sex couples,' 0 3 overturned a provision of the Defense of Marriage
Act that denied federal benefits to married same-sex couples, 10 4 held that
disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act,' 05 and, in
Brown Scott eds., 1999) (arguing the Senate was a necessary addition to Congress to check the
"demagogues" of the more popular body, the House of Representatives).
99. Thompson v. Heineman, 857 N.W.2d 731, 744 (Neb. 2015).
100. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARv. L. REV. 16, 21 (2002). Judge Barak served as a justice of the Supreme
Court of Israel from 1978-2006.
101. Suzanna Sherry, Opinion, The Good the Supreme Court Has Done Far Outweighs the
Harm, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/rooinfordebate/2015/07/06/is-thesupreme-court-too-powerful/the-good-the-supreme-court-has-done-far-outweighs-the-harm;
MADISON, supra note 98, at 167. See also State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ohio 1960),
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), discussed supra note 38 and accompanying text.
102. Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 75
(1989). In some cases, a judicial supermajority clause could arguably protect the rights of
minorities by preventing the court from overturning legislation designed to protect minority
interests. While this might be true in theory, it has not been true in practice, as demonstrated by the
case law from both Ohio and Nebraska discussed above. As for the U.S. Supreme Court, for the
past few decades, at least, the vast majority of its opinions have been rendered either unanimously
or by 5-4 votes, rather than 6-3, 7-2, or 8-1 splits. Eric Posner, Supreme Court Breakfast Table:
Why Does the Court Usually Decide Cases Either 9-0 or 5-4?, SLATE (July 1, 2014),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and-politics/the-breakfasttable/features/2014/scotusroundup
/supreme -court_- 2014_why aremost caseseither_9_0_or54.htnl.
103. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
104. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
105. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507 (2015).
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Miranda v. Arizona, found a requirement to inform defendants of their
constitutional rights,' 0 6 all on 5-4 votes.' 0 7 The principle established in Miranda
is now woven into our cultural fabric, and, in time, several of the others may
follow suit. Of course, there are instances where courts have failed to go against
the grain of majoritarian viewpoints.10 8 Professor Somin noted that many of the
U.S. Supreme Court's "worst decisions were cases where it chose not to strike
down an oppressive unconstitutional policy-cases like Plessy v. Ferguson,
which permitted racial segregation, and Korematsu v. United States, which
permitted the expulsion of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast during
World War II."to History tends to hold such decisions in poor regard, whether
or not they were rendered by wide judicial majorities.
Finally, as seen in the Thompson case, the supermajority clause works
By blocking the court from ruling on the
against judicial efficiency.
constitutionality of LB 1161, further litigation is required to resolve the issues.
This in turn has led to the controversy surrounding KXL to be drawn out even
further on both regional and national scales.
At the end of the day, the court's decision to invoke the supermajority
clause did not conclusively spell disaster for landowners, nor did it hand a clear
victory for TransCanada. Not surprisingly, two more cases challenging LB 1161
are proceeding in the lower courts. Both were brought by landowners asserting
traditional standing after TransCanada began eminent domain proceedings
against them.1 0 At least some of the issues raised by KXL are virtually certain to
work their way back up to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-74 (1966).
107. Ilya Somin, Opinion, The Supreme Court Is a Check on Big Government, Protectionfor
Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015, 2:14 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/
2015/07/06/is-the-supreme-court-too-powerful/the-supreme-court-is-a-check-on-big-governmentprotection-for-minorities. By the same token, in some cases, 5-4 decisions have undermined civil
rights by, for example, shifting the burden to plaintiffs to produce sufficient facts to make their
claims viable and survive the government's motion to dismiss, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009), and by upholding a state sodomy law as applied to homosexuals, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986). The latter case was overturned in a 6-3 decision in 2003. Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003). Empirical research is necessary to determine whether more 5-4 cases have
protected civil rights than have undermined them, but the key point remains: judges-whether they
act individually in the lower courts or in even the slimmest of majorities on appellate courts-tend
to stand as a bulwark against abuse by majority groups and legislative bodies.
108. See Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of
ConstitutionalScholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 933, 937 (2001) (arguing courts are loath to buck a
"clear majoritarian consensus"); Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of
Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 304 (2010) ("[C]ourts rarely act in a
strongly counter-majoritarian way.
109. Somin, supra note 107 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), a 7-1 decision, and
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), a 6-3 decision) (emphasis added). Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), a 7-2 decision denying citizenship to African American slaves,
belongs on this list as well.
110. Joe Duggan, Nebraska Opponents of Keystone XL PipelineReignite Legal Fight Over State
Routing Law, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.omaha.com/news/nebraska/

nebraska-opponents-of-keystone-xl-pipeline-reignite-legal-fight-over/articlee9729cfe-af5c-5bf4-8
774-45bl57adcaa3.html. TransCanada later sought approval from the PSC instead of utilizing LB
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III. CONCLUSION
Judicial supermajority clauses make bad policy and bad law. It may be true
that decisions generating either a unanimous vote or a supermajority vote can
inspire greater public confidence and popular legitimacy, but confidence and
legitimacy are warranted only if those decisions are logical and constitutionally
sound.'' It is also possible, as the Progressives believed, that such clauses could
strengthen the separation of powers among the branches of government by acting
as a check on the judiciary's power of judicial review. As explained above,
however, Nebraska's supermajority clause tips the balance too far in favor of the
legislature.
Most importantly, judicial supermajority provisions prevent very real
constitutional issues from being definitively resolved, and they allow
unconstitutional laws to continue to exist even when due process and other
important human rights are violated.1 2 That only three states have ever adopted
a judicial supermajority clause strongly indicates that these concerns outweigh
any potential advantages of such provisions.
When the delegates in Nebraska, North Dakota, and Ohio adopted their
respective supermajority clauses, the protection of the common citizen was
arguably at the forefront of their minds. Yet, if this was the objective, in
practice, it has been turned on its head. While the legislature can be-and often
is-a vehicle for progress, it is not infallible. The beauty of the system of checks
and balances is that each branch can step in with corrective measures when
another branch missteps. In the case of the judiciary, the ability to rule on the
constitutionality of the actions of the other two branches is critical. The irony
here is that by enacting the judicial supermajority requirement, these states chose
to hobble the judicial branch. As Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed in
Marbury v. Madison, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."" 3 Marshall emphasized "that the constitution
is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law" and advised courts not to
"close their eyes on the constitution," as "the framers of the constitution
contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of
the legislature."I 14
For now, the judicial supermajority clause lives on in Nebraska. As
Thompson demonstrates, litigants raising constitutional challenges to state laws

1611; its motion for dismissal of the suit as moot is pending as this essay goes to press. Joe
Duggan, Landowners Fill Courtroom, Urge Judge to Keep Their Legal Battled Against Keystone
XL Pipeline Alive, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.omaha.com/news/

nebraska/landowners-fill-courtroom-urge-judge-to-keep-their-legal-battle/article1
11 e5-9341-e3df8d9cc44f.html.

Id4befd4-767a-

111. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 243 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James

McClellan eds., 2001) (suggesting unanimous legislative decisions deserve more weight than those
reached by a simple majority).

112. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
113. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
114. Id. at 178, 179-80.
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in Nebraska should remain vigilant about the potential effects the clause may
have on their case. Even if they obtain a resounding victory in the lower courts,
should they reach the state's highest court, they will not be attempting to
persuade a simple majority of the bench-they will have to persuade a fifth judge
in order to prevail. This requires the supermajority to not only reach the merits
of the case rather than side-step the constitutional issues through standing or
other procedural or technical measures, but also to find that the provision in
question violates the state or federal constitution. This is a tall order, considering
the deferential rules of judicial interpretation applied to constitutional issues. 15
Nebraska should follow Ohio's lead and rescind the supermajority
requirement. Constitutional amendments may be adopted in Nebraska by
popular initiative and adoption by the people independent of the legislature or by
a vote of 60% of the Unicameral followed by a vote by a majority of the voters in
the state.1 6 Given that the Unicameral may be unlikely to make itself more
vulnerable to judicial reversal, popular initiative-which itself arises from the
state's progressive inclinations-may be the most plausible pathway forward.
Doing so will restore equilibrium to the system of checks and balances within the
state and will prevent serious constitutional violations-such as LB 1611-from
remaining in place long after their deficiencies become apparent.

115. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
116. NEB. CONST. art. Ill, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. III, § 4; NEB. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. Members of
the legislature may also call for a constitutional convention. NEB. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.

